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Abstract
Equating users’ true needs and desires with behavioural
measures of ’engagement’ is problematic. However, good
metrics of ’true preferences’ are difficult to define, as cogni-
tive biases make people’s preferences change with context
and exhibit inconsistencies over time. Yet, HCI research of-
ten glosses over the philosophical and theoretical depth of
what it means to infer what users really want. In this paper,
we present an alternative yet very real discussion of this is-
sue, via a fictive dialogue between senior executives in a
tech company aimed at helping people live the life they ‘re-
ally’ want to live. How will the designers settle on a metric for
their product to optimise?
Author Keywords
Preference elicitation; well-being; values in design; eudai-
monic and hedonic UX.
ACM Classification Keywords
H.5.m. [Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI)]:
Miscellaneous
Introduction
The question of how to bridge the potential gap between
what users actually do and what they ‘really wanted’ to do
has a relatively long history in human-computer interac-
tion research. In the 1960’s, Warren Teitelman’s ‘Do What I
Mean’ (DWIM) philosophy argued that systems should not
just execute whatever potentially erroneous instructions
users put into a terminal [30]. Instead, they should try to
interpret users’ true intentions and correct their errors (the
implication being DWIM, NowWhat I Say (or Do)). In prac-
tice, Teitelman’s error-correction systems were critiqued as
merely reflecting what their designer would have meant (‘do
what Teitelman means’) [29].
The issue crops up in more fundamental ways in the do-
mains of decision support and recommender systems, where
the gap is not just between what the user typed and what
they really intended, but between recorded interaction be-
haviour and what can be inferred about the user’s wants and
needs. On those rare occasions where HCI researchers in
such fields venture into the moral minefield of defining ’what
users really want’, they often provide definitions which are
intuitively reasonable yet dis-satisfyingly cursory; the related
philosophical debate is then swiftly swept under the carpet.
For instance, in an otherwise enlightening chapter, Jameson
et al. offer the following on what decision-support systems
should optimise for: “... a ‘good outcome’ [is] one that the
chooser is (or would be) satisfied with in retrospect, after
having acquired the most relevant knowledge and experi-
ence. Admittedly, this assumption is subject to debate...”
[14, p. 35].
Similarly, Pommeranz et al. write in relation to methods for
eliciting user preferences: “More research is needed to de-
sign preference elicitation interfaces that elicit correct pref-
erence information from the user” [23, p. 361]. Later, they
consider what normative aspects might be required to deter-
mine such ‘correctness’ of a preference and find answers to
this question in short supply: “There is much room for more
explicit consideration of human preference construction also
including values and affective aspects” [23, p. 365].
Parallel questions are arising in recent AI research. For in-
stance, techniques like ‘inverse reinforcement learning’
(IRL) attempt to infer an underlying goal function from be-
havioural output [21]. It is implied that such goal functions
are equivalent to the ‘true desires’ of the human from whom
the machine is learning. Indeed, as Stuart Russel put it, a
well-aligned AI ‘will watch all of us to learn more about what
it is that we really want”.1 A common assumption in these
techniques is that humans make optimal decisions, with de-
viations from optimality reflecting ‘random noise’ in action se-
lection [11]. However, real human decision-making deviates
systematically from optimality, because of cognitive biases
like asymmetric perception of losses and gains, which make
people sensitive to how identical outcomes are framed, or
hyperbolic discounting of future rewards, which often make
people inconsistent over time [31, 15]. A rational model may
wrongly assume that the true preference of, for example, a
smoker who is trying (and failing) to quit is to smoke [11].
Indeed, some recent work in this space acknowledges the
limitations of the pure behaviourist dream. Armstrong et
al. argue that current IRL methods are “fundamentally and
philosophically incapable of establishing a ‘reasonable’ re-
ward for the human”, which can only be overcome, they ar-
gue, by building in “normative assumptions about the reward
and/or planner” [2, p. 2]. However, the authors stop short of
articulating what those normative assumptions might be.
An alternative approach is to devolve responsibility for those
normative assumptions back to the user. Numerous ways of
explicitly eliciting users’ preferences have been explored in
the literature, including user ratings and example-critiquing
in recommender systems [24, 23] and absolute measure-
ment and pairwise comparison in decision support systems
[1, 6]. Moreover, pioneering work in this space explored
1Talk at TED2017 https://www.ted.com/talks/stuart_russell_how_ai_might_make_us_better_people/transcript
ways to let users inspect and tweak a system’s model of
them [7, 18, 24, 17].
However, explicit methods also run into problems. Foremost,
the elicitation process itself greatly influences what users say
they want. For example, users may prefer different options
based on whether they are framed as losses or gains [23], or
depending on the moment in time in which they are asked.
What point in time reflects what the user ’really’ wants - the
most recent, a weighted average over the last day / week /
year, or something else? [16, 25].
Related to the question of timeframes is the tension between
broad or narrow construals of the user’s context. One of the
foundational tenets of user-centred design, as articulated
by Ritter et al., is to consider the user context more broadly
[26]. That is, moving beyond the immediate, task-related is-
sues pertaining to a specific product, where the user’s goals
can be more easily approximated, and instead view appli-
cations of technology as "the development of permanent
support systems and not one-off products that are complete
once implemented and deployed" [26, p. 44]. In other words,
the designer should consider longer-term effects of systems
on people’s lives, which in turn requires deeper insight in or-
der to align systems with users’ more general goals, values,
and life situation.
The question of how to elicit ’correct’ preferences therefore
ends up connecting with the philosophical debate on the
fundamental constituents of ‘what makes someone’s life
go best’. While it’s possible that one’s best life could be at
odds with one’s desires, it is often held that being able to sat-
isfy ‘true desires’ are at least partly constitutive of the good
life. Most philosophers’ answers tend to involve one or more
of the following: pleasurable experiences or ‘hedonism’
(e.g. [4]), where a good life is one full of pleasurable experi-
ences; desire-satisfaction (e.g. [22]), where a good life is
one in which one’s desires are fulfilled; and objective list
theories, where a good life is one in which certain objectively
worthwhile things are experienced, achieved or engaged in
(e.g. [13]). Hedonists often concede that certain hedonic
pleasures are more truly constitutive of a good life, and pro-
ponents of desire-fulfillment acknowledge that the fulfillment
of misguided desires contributes little to one’s best interests.
As we hope to show, these philosophical debates underlie
some of the conceptual difficulties encountered by the more
practically-oriented research within the HCI / AI research
cited above.
To illustrate this, we now present an alternative yet very real
take on the issue, via a fictional dialogue between senior ex-
ecutives in a global tech company whose product aims to
help people live their best possible life. How can they settle
on the metric their product should optimise so that they give
their users what they really want? In addition to the literature
reviewed so far, the positions of our fictive designers are in-
spired by common views within classical economics and ra-
tional actor models [19], behavioural economics [31, 15], and
philosophical and psychological work on the ’good life’ [27,
8], as well as common ideological stances. We acknowledge
that this is only a portion of the relevant literature, and we
have taken artistic license in our formulations of each stance.
As such, we cannot claim our fictive characters to be fully
and fairly representative of the possible range of positions.
Furthermore, any resemblance to real persons is probably
not accidental.
What Users Really Want: The Tale of Gamaface
SCENE: The Californian morning sun shines through the
gleaming windows into a pristine meeting room at the head-
quarters of Gamaface, a global technology company. Gamaface
is the industry leader in what they call ’algorithmic life ser-
vices’. Their augmented reality platform - which combines
decision support, persuasive computing, and ubiquitous per-
sonalised nudging - is used by 3 billion users 24 hours a day,
7 days a week.
CAST:
• Sunny Zuckerbezos, CEO of Gamaface
@Walkin_on_sunshine | Mission: connecting people
and data to make life worth living.
• Randy Na, Information Architect
@Nozick_SoSick | Libertarian | Autono-me, autono-
you | "I hold it to be the inalienable right of anybody to
go to hell in his own way."
• Harald Richter, User Researcher
@WinkWinkNudgeNudge | Pavlov’s dog, striving to be
Pavlov’s bell. #cognitivebias #positivepsychology
• Nichola Machian, Lead Ethicist
@eudaimonia_for_all | "Meaning arises when subjec-
tive attraction meets objective attractiveness"
ACT: In search of a metric
Sunny: So, I’ve called you all here to pitch ideas for a new
metric that will drive the direction of our services for the fu-
ture. As you know, millions of people rely on our technol-
ogy to guide their every waking (and sleeping) minute. The
Gamaface mission has always been about our users ... giv-
ing them what they want, helping them to live better lives, the
lives they really want to live. Across all our user’s devices -
laptops, smartphones, smartwatches, and smart glasses -
our activity feed suggests what they should do next to live
their ideal life. We help them find stuff that’s ’relevant’, see
their most ’engaging’ videos, and ping them ’helpful’ info
when they need it.
But what does any of that actually mean? How can we be
sure that we are giving users what they really want? What
we need, my friends, is a clear answer to this question; a new
metric towards which all our services should be geared; a
new optimisation metric for life. So come on, hit me with your
ideas!
Randy: I’m going to stop you right there, sir, if I may. What’s
wrong with our existing systems? We infer what users want
from what they do and what other people like them do. If they
spend every spare second watching cat videos, then our
algorithms should give them more cat videos. If they keep
watching them, that means our algorithms got it right. If they
don’t like them they will stop looking at them. Our algorithms
will then show them less in the future ...
Harald: Woah there. I totally disagree. People are slaves to
simple reward functions inherited from our evolutionary past.
We know how to hack these reward systems, so if we leave
people to their own devices (no pun intended) they will sim-
ply do whatever our algorithms nudge them to do. That might
be binge-watching cat videos and ordering takeout pizza. It
probably won’t be filling in their tax returns or exercise ...
Nichola: But we could be nudging them to do those things
instead! Even better, we could nudge them to do something
truly worthwhile, like reading poetry, or contributing to sci-
ence, or meditating on the miracle of their very existence!
Randy: How patronising! As cosmopolitan, liberal, college-
educated, Silicon Valley elites, who are you to decide what
people should be ’nudged’ towards? Sounds pretty paternal-
istic to me!
Sunny: OK people, let’s work together here. On the one
hand, Harald and Nichola are on to something: our algo-
rithmic life services shouldn’t feed people’s worst habits. But
Randy also has a point; Gamaface must remain a neutral
platform, with no political, ethical or aesthetic biases. All our
algorithms are just based on pure mathematics and user be-
haviour - not on force-feeding them a specific notion of the
good life.
Randy: Exactly. The point of our service is to free people
from the tyranny of the structures that control their lives -
the government, social norms, the media - and let them do
whatever they want to do. If 99% of people choose to indulge
what you call their ‘worst habits’, that’s their prerogative and
we should help them. Equally, the 1% who want to waste
their time reading poetry are entitled to do so!
Nichola: Are you really saying you believe that there is no
objective difference between the aesthetic value of cat videos
and Shakespeare?
Randy: My opinion of the value of anything isn’t the point
here. The point is that none of us get to decide that for some-
one else!
Nichola: Ah, but you’ll agree that each individual may value
different activities or pursuits as ’higher’ and ’lower’? And if
someone wants to pursue something they think is worthwhile
- say, reading poetry - we should help them?
Randy: Mhmmm ...
Nichola: So if they wish they would read more poetry, but
find themselves watching cat videos, we should stop the cat
videos and replace them with poetry!
Randy: Nope! People gotta live with the consequences of
their failure to live up to their ideals!
Harald: Aha! You’re admitting that people might sometimes
end up doing things they don’t really want to do! In fact, this
is a well documented phenomenon in behavioural science.
Our system 1 - the fast, powerful, routine animal part of our
brain - wants one thing, and system 2 - the slow, rational,
reflective human part - wants another. Unfortunately, even
though people identify with their system 2, system 1 usually
gets its own way.
Randy: Well, I don’t know about that system 1, 2 mumbo-
jumbo - speak for yourself pal, my systems are all fine, thank
you very much. I guess maybe sometimes people are con-
flicted about what they want ... but even then, who are you to
interpret which desire should prevail - which system repre-
sents what they really want?
Nichola: We shouldn’t decide between us in this room, but
we could let the wisdom of science and philosophy decide!
Psychologists have spent decades figuring out which activ-
ities and circumstances make people happy with their lives,
and philosophers have pondered it for millennia. Shouldn’t
our systems help people live the way experts say make a life
go well?
Randy: That’s absurd! The world is changing faster than
ever before, and you suggest that some dead navel-gazing
philosophers know what’s best for people? Or maybe that we
nudge everyone to get married if psychologists say married
people are happier on average? What someone really wants
is a function of their free will and their unique personality, and
no-one besides themselves are in a position to know what’s
best for them ...
Nichola: Are you seriously denying that things like close
friends, meaningful work, good physical health, and feeling
competent and valued in your community aren’t universal
constituents of a good life? It seems pretty obvious that peo-
ple have fundamental - and universal - needs that must be
satisfied for them to feel their lives are going well. We should
help them get what will make them happy and fulfilled, even
if they haven’t themselves realised what the important things
in life are ...
Harald: But people also want to feel that they’re in control of
their lives - we can’t dictate to them what they should want.
Hmm... but what we could do is help them reflect on what
they want from life and then let them set the nudges they
need from our products accordingly ...
Randy: For God’s sake... People don’t want to live like saints!
It’s all very well to meditate on what your ‘ideal self’ might
want but sometimes people just want to indulge and we
shouldn’t make them feel bad about that! Besides, who
wants to be forced to reflect like some Buddha on your life?
Most people are lazy.
Sunny: OK, there’s a lot of stuff here. Let’s come back to my
original question to you all. Given everything you’ve said,
what is the metric you think we should optimise, and how do
we do it?
Metric #1: Engagement with preferred options
Randy: Fundamentally, we must believe that our users can
choose for themselves what the good life is - anything else
is frankly disrespectful. So our metric should be rooted in
behaviour: If people engage more with the options we give
them, it must, all else being equal, be because they find them
valuable. ‘But what if they’re addicted’, you say? We cor-
rect for that by asking them now and then whether they are
currently doing what they most want to be doing given the
their options. Surely, if they’re addicted, their answer will be
’no’. So we use two metrics: what they actually do andwhat
they in the moment say they most want to do. When we
optimise both, then we give them what they really want.
So basically, we’re almost there. Our apps and augmented
reality systems already put the options users engage with
the most in front of their eyes and fingertips. But we build
a little extra that we could brand Gamaface Autonomy SenseTM:
a simple overlay that occasionally asks our users, on a scale
from 1-10, to which degree they are currently doing what
they most want to be doing given their options. We get re-
sponses across a user’s different activities, add some ran-
dom noise to the activities we recommend, et voilà! We learn
the activity schedule that optimises the user’s engagement
with preferred options.
Metric #2: Regret when reflecting on past activity
Harald: But people often regret their past behaviour, even
if they thought they wanted it in the moment! Really, what
we should do is help them get as close to how they wish to
be when they take the time to reflect. Therefore, our metric
should be amount of regret when the user carefully con-
siders his past activity. When we minimise this regret, then
we are giving users what they really want.
So we build a system we brand Gamaface Deep Ideal Self
LearningTM - this is guaranteed to play well with our audi-
ence! It lets the user review a timeline of her past behaviour.
For each activity, or activity class, she rates on a scale from
1-10 how closely what she did matches what she’d like her
ideal self to do, and/or how often she’d like her ideal self to do
it. This will allow our algorithms to learn how to present activ-
ities and nudge her so that her actual behaviour gets closest
to her ideal self.
Randy: This makes my skin crawl. First, it doesn’t matter
what people would have chosen under ‘ideal’ reflective
circumstances, whatever they might be (let me guess; sit-
ting cross-legged like a Zen master while soothing dolphin
noises play in the background?). Second, it’s disrespect-
ful to override someone’s present desires in order to serve
some inferred ‘ideal’ desires. Finally, the random, irrational,
and downright messy nature of the human condition is what
makes life worth living.
Nichola: Well, that explains all the garbage piled up around
your desk. Harald, I think Randy is right that we shouldn’t
place too much weight on what people regret about their past
behaviour. Regret is an imperfect guide; the grass is always
greener on the other side, and maybe that goes for deathbed
lamentations too. Who’s to say that you wouldn’t have re-
gretted an alternative life course even more? And if you don’t
regret your actual life choices, maybe that’s because you
don’t appreciate what could have been! Who knows which of
all your possible future selves would have the ‘best life’?
Sunny: So are you saying it’s impossible?
Nichola: Well, not entirely. I think the solution is to draw on
wisdom outside of the individual - putting the burden of figur-
ing out what the good life is on the shoulders of each user is
frankly setting them up for failure.
Metric #3.1: Similar, wiser users’ engagement and regret
Nichola: The first option is learn from our users’ aggregated
wisdom, and use comparisons across different people’s real
lives as they actually lived them to infer the necessary condi-
tions for a happy and meaningful life. So we can use Randy’s
and Harald’s suggested systems to collect data, but the goal
is to create metrics that refer to the collective elicited pref-
erences of similar users with more life experience in-
stead of just whether the user himself thinks something is
good for him. We are most likely to give users what they re-
ally want when we, based on the accumulated life wisdom
of others, optimise expected engagement with preferred op-
tions and minimise expected subsequent regret. This system
we callGamaface Wisdom of AgeTM - a collaborative filtering
approach to the good life, in which each user’s contribution
is weighted by their experience. We set default choices and
nudges of our youngest users based on the wisdom of more
experienced users.
Metric #3.2: Alignment with guru-guided good life
The other option is to use some expert guidance on the life,
or what we might call the ’wisdom of gurus’: then our metric
is alignment between a user’s circumstance and what
the guru system says leads to an enjoyable/meaningful
life.
Certain conditions have been found by psychological re-
search to make everyone miserable, so some of the guru
reference values should be the same for everyone. On the
other end of the spectrum, there might be many different
ways to make a life go really, really well, so here we could
let users choose which guru system they prefer, like their
favourite philosopher, religion, or other ideology. We give
users what they really want when we minimise the condi-
tions in their lives that reliably make people miserable (e.g.
loneliness) and optimise the conditions their guru system of
choice says makes for an ideal life.
This system we call Gamaface Guru-Guided Good Life
(G4L)TM . We involve different experts directly in creating the
values and nudges. We could also offer users an exclusive
option of having our system trained on a text corpus from
their philosophy of choice. Imagine that users can bring their
favourite Buddhist texts–or your Ayn Rand novels, Randy?–
and our machine learning algorithms will learn its values and
calibrate the user’s system accordingly?
Sunny: Well, I’m going to have fun explaining all this to our
shareholders... Time for lunch!
Discussion
Given the problems with equating users’ true needs and de-
sires with simple behavioural measures of ‘engagement’,
alternative metrics are needed. In this paper, we have dis-
cussed this issue in the context of a dialogue between de-
signers in a fictive tech company searching for a metric with
which to measure whether they are giving users what they
‘really’ want.
Despite the often glib treatment of these questions in HCI
research, as seen in the examples in the introduction, there
are some notable exceptions. The general critique of the
behaviourist tendency in recommender systems is well-
articulated by Ekstrand &Willemsen [10]. They suggest
one promising corrective, which allows users to choose be-
tween different algorithms underlying their recommender
systems [9]. In allowing some direct control of the inference
process, this is reminiscent of earlier work which aimed to
create ‘scrutable’ user models which are transparent and
configurable [17, 18].
Harald’s call for systems which help put users in a position
from which they can reflect on themselves and their desires,
has some precedent in Slovak et al.’s proposal to design for
‘reflective practicum’; a state in which someone can engage
in transformative revision of their outlook or behaviour [28].
In addition, we suggest that empirical findings from posi-
tive psychology and reflections from the philosophy of what
makes life go well will prove important as a source of more
opinionated takes on how we might design to support peo-
ple’s ‘better selves’ and draw on life wisdom that does not
originate with the designer or individual user [27, 8, 5].
Nichola’s call to consider themeaningfulness of user expe-
riences is something explored by Mekler and Hornbæk, who
argue that UX designers should consider eudaimonic (‘living
the good and virtuous life’) as well as hedonic (‘pleasurable’)
experiences [20]. Similarly, Zimmerman proposes ‘designing
for the self’, such that products can help their users become
the people they desire to be [32].
For those sympathetic to Randy’s position, the notion of an
external force guiding users’ search for the good life may
detract from the sense in which an individual ought to be re-
sponsible for their own life journey. However, behavioural
economists have found that the crucial question for whether
people are in favour of ‘nudging’ –in the sense of setting
up the choice environments to support particular kinds of
behaviour– is whether or not they agree with the vision of the
good life behind those nudges [12]. We can easily imagine
a future in which users expect the right to choose which nor-
mative assumptions should be embodied in the algorithms
feeding their recommender systems.
A central goal of this paper has been to show that whereas
it is easy to criticise tech companies for equating users’ true
preferences with simple metrics of engagement, it is not ob-
vious what good alternative metrics look like. Every metric
implicitly embodies particular assumptions about human na-
ture - and ultimately about the good life - with few decisive ar-
guments for favoring one as the ’best’. It is a fallacy, however,
to conclude that the question is therefore not worth bothering
with and/or that all metrics are equally valid. Some ways of
solving the problem are clearly worse - such as simply equat-
ing true preference with number of clicks or time spent using
a service - even if there is no way to tell which of the better
alternatives might be the global optimum. We believe that
allowing users the to choose between different ways for a
system to infer their preferences - for example, implementa-
tions of Randy’s, Harald’s, and Nichola’s positions - would be
a big step forward. To reach such a future, we need to prop-
erly engage with the issue and explore, build, evaluate, and
discuss what good alternatives look like.
Some readers may still feel that this discussion is akin to
moral philosophers’ "trolley problem" - important in principle,
but not terribly relevant in practice [3]. However, even though
recommender and decision-support systems typically used
today are limited in scope to specific task and interest con-
texts, more sophisticated systems could begin to model their
longer term effects on user’s lives, and user’s preferences
towards such influence. In fact, such a future might rapidly
be approaching. Addressing recent criticisms of Facebook,
CEO Mark Zuckerberg recently announced that his personal
challenge for 2018 included "making sure that time spent on
Facebook is time well spent" 2. Following up a week later,
Zuckerberg elaborated that his team felt "a responsibility to
make sure our services aren’t just fun to use, but also good
for people’s well-being" and that he would be "changing the
goal [of] our product teams from focusing on helping you find
relevant content to helping you have more meaningful so-
cial interactions"3 . Time will tell which, if any, of the paths
suggested by Randy, Harald, and Nichola will be taken by
world-leading social media platforms.
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